Judge denies motion, orders enforcement of IRS summons; Petitioner moves for relief from Order, as Order is void
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At the September 13, 2017, hearing of Petitioner’s July 17, 2017, motion to dismiss,
the United States Department of Justice attorney opened with the usual
perversion of the facts and falsification of the record after finding
himself in checkmate.
The Internal Revenue Service’s case depends 100 percent on the presumption that Petitioner is a 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1) “person,” but presents no evidence of said presumption (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”[1]).
Rather than copping to failure and inability to produce such evidence upon challenge by Petitioner, said USDOJ attorney, as is typical, pretended Petitioner never raised the issue and went off on a tangent, accusing Petitioner of arguing that Petitioner was not a person—which Petitioner did not do.
The USDOJ attorney’s tag-team partner, the judge, then began accusing Petitioner of arguing things which Petitioner never did (nor are reflected in the record of the case) and asking for case citations in support of the false arguments he falsely attributed to Petitioner.
Thereafter, the judge entered his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons.
As the transcript of the September 13, 2017, hearing and record of the case evince, the court is a kangaroo court:
“kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p, 359.
There literally is nothing about what people believe is the federal judicial system throughout the Union that is legitimate; when exposed for fraud or treason, executive and judicial officers thereof pretend nothing was said, ignore material facts and failures harmful to their objective, and instead attribute to those proving the fraud and treason, events which said officers fabricate from whole cloth and never happened and of which there is no evidence.
This is possible—and their M.O.—only because they enjoy a monopoly over what appears to be the judicial system of the national government of the Republic but in actuality is the judicial system of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation,[2] usurping exercise of jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by its corporate charter, 16 Stat. 419, to the District of Columbia.
Achilles’ heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States
Except for the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1), the Achilles’ heel of every other executive and judicial officer of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States” (“a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) is that none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The oath of office of the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1) is the only such oath or affirmation that is provided by the Constitution (see Article II, Section 8 thereof) and therefore not subject to alteration by Congress.
This is a critical defect for all other executive and judicial officers—as none have acceded to, or are authorized to exercise, the executive or judicial power of that certain “United States” of the Constitution (wherein “United States” is a proper noun and not a contrived statutory term with an opposite constitutional meaning) anywhere in the Union.
This is just more proof that all courts of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) throughout the Union are kangaroo courts.
The same deficiency is true for all Senators and Representatives of Congress—as none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution or acceded to the legislative power conferred in Article I of the Constitution.
Republican versus municipal form of government
Said congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the statutory “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have betrayed the trust vested in them by the American People and foisted on each member of the Union by way of stealth legislation, a municipal form of government and denied each such member of the Union a republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.
The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:
The only provision of the Constitution to which the current oath of office of Congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have a duty to honor is Art. I, § 8, cl. 17—all shows of apparent fidelity to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is time to abolish the current municipal form of government which has been implanted in every member of the Union and establish in each a republican form of government as intended by the Framers and guaranteed in the Constitution.
Courts of the “United States”: Enforcers of municipal law
The situation with the courts (and United States Department of Justice) is that they refuse to follow or adhere to the definition or meaning of their own fraudulent statutory terms—meaning there is no basis for agreement and therefore no due process of law or remedy, and the situation, ultimately, is not a legal one per se but a political in nature, a predicament succinctly encapsulated in the following maxims of law:
“A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words of the law there should be no departure.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. (8th ed.), rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.
“Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.” Id. at 2145.
“Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.” Id. at 2165.
Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing “A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible” (see “kangaroo court,” supra): There being no other immediate remedy for the instant situation, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, filed Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(4) Motion for Relief from Order—as the said Order is void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to all provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The contents of said motion are backed up with citations from Supreme Court cases and are conclusive and devastating and have direct application in every civil or criminal proceeding throughout the Union in every court of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”: “a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
[1] “This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[A] presumption is not evidence.”); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935) (“[A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant’s favor.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938) (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”). Although a decision of this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994), dealing with presumptions in VA law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide.” Routen v. West, 142 F.3d. 1434, 1439 C.A.Fed. (1998).
[2] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
The Internal Revenue Service’s case depends 100 percent on the presumption that Petitioner is a 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1) “person,” but presents no evidence of said presumption (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”[1]).
Rather than copping to failure and inability to produce such evidence upon challenge by Petitioner, said USDOJ attorney, as is typical, pretended Petitioner never raised the issue and went off on a tangent, accusing Petitioner of arguing that Petitioner was not a person—which Petitioner did not do.
The USDOJ attorney’s tag-team partner, the judge, then began accusing Petitioner of arguing things which Petitioner never did (nor are reflected in the record of the case) and asking for case citations in support of the false arguments he falsely attributed to Petitioner.
Thereafter, the judge entered his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons.
As the transcript of the September 13, 2017, hearing and record of the case evince, the court is a kangaroo court:
“kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p, 359.
There literally is nothing about what people believe is the federal judicial system throughout the Union that is legitimate; when exposed for fraud or treason, executive and judicial officers thereof pretend nothing was said, ignore material facts and failures harmful to their objective, and instead attribute to those proving the fraud and treason, events which said officers fabricate from whole cloth and never happened and of which there is no evidence.
This is possible—and their M.O.—only because they enjoy a monopoly over what appears to be the judicial system of the national government of the Republic but in actuality is the judicial system of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation,[2] usurping exercise of jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by its corporate charter, 16 Stat. 419, to the District of Columbia.
Achilles’ heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States
Except for the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1), the Achilles’ heel of every other executive and judicial officer of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States” (“a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) is that none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The oath of office of the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1) is the only such oath or affirmation that is provided by the Constitution (see Article II, Section 8 thereof) and therefore not subject to alteration by Congress.
This is a critical defect for all other executive and judicial officers—as none have acceded to, or are authorized to exercise, the executive or judicial power of that certain “United States” of the Constitution (wherein “United States” is a proper noun and not a contrived statutory term with an opposite constitutional meaning) anywhere in the Union.
This is just more proof that all courts of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) throughout the Union are kangaroo courts.
The same deficiency is true for all Senators and Representatives of Congress—as none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution or acceded to the legislative power conferred in Article I of the Constitution.
Republican versus municipal form of government
Said congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the statutory “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have betrayed the trust vested in them by the American People and foisted on each member of the Union by way of stealth legislation, a municipal form of government and denied each such member of the Union a republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.
The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:
- commenced June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 306 (see 182), when Congress, with malice aforethought, transmuted the word “state” into a statutory term with a constitutionally opposite meaning that comprehends only the District of Columbia and the territories and excludes every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union;
- secured when Congress on June 16, 1866, proposed, 14 Stat. 358, and on July 9, 1868, ratified the political Trojan horse known as the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, whose primary purpose was to create an artificial class of Americans, municipal citizen-residents of the new “State” of the new “United States,” i.e., the District of Columbia, called “citizens of the United States”;
- augmented when Congress on February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation;
- facilitated by Congress’ creation August 14, 1935, of the Social Security retirement program (and Ponzi scheme) to provide justification for construing all participants thereof to be a resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia (see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(13)); and
- completed upon transmutation of every definition of the statutory terms “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law to include and mean the District of Columbia (a municipal corporation) and exclude every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
- Government began treating of the supreme political power and sovereign authority in the Republic, the American People, also known as the “join tenants in the sovereignty” (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793)), as political subjects of Congress and so-called persons with rights and duties;
- The focus shifted away from unalienable rights, which every man holds inherently and are guaranteed in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, to civil rights, which are bestowed by Congress on the new “citizens of the United States” and alleged subjects of Congress, the American People; and
- Government began requiring a permission, in the form of a license (because of the fraudulent statutory definitions of “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law, every license in America—even the driver’s license—is the requirement of the payment of a certain sum by an alleged “person” for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling for the general purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation), to exercise the unalienable and constitutional right to liberty and property and the inseparable right to contract derived therefrom.
The only provision of the Constitution to which the current oath of office of Congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have a duty to honor is Art. I, § 8, cl. 17—all shows of apparent fidelity to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is time to abolish the current municipal form of government which has been implanted in every member of the Union and establish in each a republican form of government as intended by the Framers and guaranteed in the Constitution.
Courts of the “United States”: Enforcers of municipal law
The situation with the courts (and United States Department of Justice) is that they refuse to follow or adhere to the definition or meaning of their own fraudulent statutory terms—meaning there is no basis for agreement and therefore no due process of law or remedy, and the situation, ultimately, is not a legal one per se but a political in nature, a predicament succinctly encapsulated in the following maxims of law:
“A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words of the law there should be no departure.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. (8th ed.), rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.
“Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.” Id. at 2145.
“Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.” Id. at 2165.
Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing “A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible” (see “kangaroo court,” supra): There being no other immediate remedy for the instant situation, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, filed Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(4) Motion for Relief from Order—as the said Order is void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to all provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The contents of said motion are backed up with citations from Supreme Court cases and are conclusive and devastating and have direct application in every civil or criminal proceeding throughout the Union in every court of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”: “a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
[1] “This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[A] presumption is not evidence.”); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935) (“[A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant’s favor.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938) (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”). Although a decision of this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994), dealing with presumptions in VA law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide.” Routen v. West, 142 F.3d. 1434, 1439 C.A.Fed. (1998).
[2] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
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